Task force 74 in the Indian Ocean
The arrival of the US Seventh fleet in the Indian Ocean caused much apprehension in an already volatile Indo – East Pakistan war zone, in the middle of Dec 1971. India had just staved off a Pakistani attack on its western borders and was crushing Pakistani army forces at its Eastern flanks, off Calcutta. It was at this juncture that the mighty 7th fleet, headed by its flagship USS Enterprise, steamed into the Indian ocean. Hot at their heels was a Soviet task force, supported by submarines. Much has been written about this event, but unfortunately, quite a bit of it is glazed with bombast. After some deep digging, I unearthed a better picture, so here it is.Following the Agartala case, the West Pakistani government’s
keenness to prove that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was an Indian agent and a
separatist backfired, and a mass movement erupted. Yahya Khan became the
dictator of Pakistan and surprisingly held open elections only to find the
rebel Mujibur Rehman winning most of the seats, 141 of them amid murmurs of
secession from West Pakistan. The Awami
league headed by Mujib won the 1970 elections and was in control of East
Pakistan, much to Yahya’s disgust. He then launched Operation searchlight with the
ruthless dictum – ‘kill 3 ½ million of ‘em Bengalis and the rest will eat out
of our hands’. In the resulting genocide, millions perished and others (close
to 10 million) took to flight, towards the Indian border, while India offered support
to the Mukti Bahini.
Anderson explains - When the slaughter of the Bengalis
began, Archer K. Blood, then U.S. Consul General in Dacca, the capital of East
Pakistan, sent details to U.S. Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad and to
the State Department in Washington. Blood was summoned to Washington in June
1971, but planned to return to Dacca for the remaining eighteen months of his
tour of duty. At the State Department he was told he was an alarmist, and was
given a desk in the personnel office.
Nixon and Kissinger threw their lot with Yahya while
badmouthing Indira Gandhi, India’s prime minister, in the vilest terms. While
the bad personal equations resulted in a lot of friction, Nixon believed that the
bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan were more congenial to him than the
complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of India (Kissinger).
Nixon had in the meanwhile planned to restart friendly
relations with China, using Pakistan’s help. That said, Nixon also supported
Pakistan and their dastardly actions in the public sphere and refused to
condemn the atrocities being wrought in East Bengal. Yahya ramped up the
rhetoric accusing India of direct support for Mujib, and launched a propaganda
campaign ‘crush India’. Indira Gandhi who wanted to stop the genocide quickly was informed by Gen Manekshaw that it was not yet opportune due to various
tactical reasons. As the water was getting to a boil, Russia warned Yahya not
to go to war. China was expected to support Pakistan and the reason why
Manekshaw delayed his counter was to stop the Chinese with the snow and the ice-clad Himalayas in December. War was inevitable, armies were amassed at both
western and eastern borders, and the Taj Mahal was camouflaged.
In Dec 1971, Pakistan preemptively attacked Indian airbases, and as the world quickly condemned the attack, Nixon demurred, stating staunch
neutrality and non-involvement. However, that was only in public, for in secret
he decided to help Yahya, in spite of a congressional ban on any form of aid to
these warring countries. Iran, Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia were contacted
and asked to stealthily assist Pakistan by transferring fighter planes and
armaments, which they all did, except for Iran. Indian forces countered the
attack with massive well-coordinated air, sea, and land assaults on Pakistan
from all fronts. The Pak navy was decimated and soon enough the submarine Ghazi
was sunk, a story I had written about some years ago. As China continued their
military preparations (53rd and 157th infantry) at the Himalayas to carry out
‘urgent missions’, Russia contemplated a preemptive strike at Sinkiang to wipe
out some of China's missile launchers.
Anderson the Washington journalist who had been publishing
about the misdeeds of the Nixon administration thus far now informed the world
about the US Pakistan tilt and the movements of task force 74 – the seventh
fleet, and the dangerous turn such a move could take, potentially WW III.
Nixon and Kissinger were absolutely convinced that India was planning to crush Pakistan once and for all, and many of their actions were based on that singular premise. There may have been a lack of clarity in India’s stance on the retaking of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but there were no declarations of a larger invasion strategy. Despite assurances from India and USSR albeit later in Dec that they would not dismember West Pakistan, Nixon, was convinced that Indira Gandhi, who he hated fervently, was lying. We now head to Dacca, to the closing stage of the 14-day war (which started on 3rd Dec 1971) in the Eastern theater, while the global powers were still in the grip of cold war throes.
Pakistan was aligned to the US, and a member of the SEATO plus CENTO while India was tied to the USSR. The Bengalis of East Pakistan were the aggrieved party and were pulled into this fracas by Pakistan, who was in turn allied with China. Note here that China though communist, were wary of Russians at their borders and had thence opened themselves to talks with the US, through Pakistan’s Yahya Khan. The US, represented by Kissinger, wanting an ally on USSR’s borders, was mighty thankful to Pakistan, for this opening. At that juncture, India signed the friendship and peace treaty with USSR, due to these strategic concerns and alliances. Anyway, the war on the Eastern front which started with the offensives on the 3rd Dec saw India’s infantry might at play, and by the 10th, Pakistani defense had ground to a halt, and the Pakistan Army in the East had made its first tentative move to obtain a ceasefire.
On the 11th, the news hit the press and India was in an uproar, hearing about the US naval moves against her. A lot of things happened the next day. The fleet arrived in Singapore on the 12th, Nixon concluded that China would not act and the opinion was that this could even culminate in a US-USSR conflict. A Soviet delegation in Delhi reported that India would not invade West Pakistan. Four C130 aircraft owned by the UK airlifted most American personnel from Dacca. Nixon and Kissinger flew off to attend some MBFR talks and the 7th fleet in Singapore awaited further orders. Niazi is exhorted to hold on for another 36 hours by Gul Hassan – Yellows from the North, whites from the South.
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The US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Adm Zumwalt halted the fleet (Kissinger says he halted it, awaiting a report from Moscow) at Singapore for two days since his advice had not been taken, and because vague orders had been given by the civilian administration. The original orders for the TG74 were to deploy to a position off East Pakistan. Adm Zumwalt felt that this would put them in harm’s way and he convinced the powers to change their deployment area to a holding position, South-East of Sri Lanka. Finally, they were ordered to proceed to the Bay of Bengal through the Malacca Strait in broad daylight so as to be as conspicuous as possible.
Late on 16th December, the day after Pakistan forces in East
Pakistan surrendered, TG 74 arrived at this station, many hundred miles away
from the combat zone. The TF74 comprised the nuclear aircraft carrier USS
Enterprise, three missile-bearing destroyers, 3-4 amphibious assault ships, an
ammunition ship, and a nuclear class submarine. It was considerably powerful,
compared to the Soviet task force in pursuit, but still 2 days behind.
The 7th fleet as we saw, arrived at Lanka on the 16th, a day after the surrender. Lanka already the refueling point for Pakistan due to overflight bans, now formally invited the US fleet in, for demonstrative purposes. The first Soviet task force arrived on the 18th and a second on the 26th. The waters churned as the naval assortments faced and shadowed each other, though unequal in might.
So, what was it all about? A subtle threat to intervene if
India invaded West Pakistan? Mishra explains the rationale - Considering the
international milieu where its (US) stock was low by the Vietnam overhang, the
emergence of a technologically improved and numerically robust Soviet Navy
under Admiral Gorshkov, and the necessity of sending a reassuring signal to its
allies, mandated some visible proof. The naval deployment was a gesture of
solidarity for a formal ally (Pakistan) and an indicator to a future partner
(China), that the US could be relied upon to abide by its formal commitments.
Kissinger confirms it in his memoirs - The Soviet aim in
the wake of our China initiative was to humiliate Peking and to demonstrate the
futility of reliance on either China or the United States as an ally. Nixon
had to disprove this by sending a clear message, even though E Pakistan was
falling and he had been reasonably assured that India would not attack the
West.
Jack Anderson, however, concluded that it was - a) compel
India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force, b) weaken
India's blockade against East Pakistan, c) possibly divert the Indian aircraft
carrier Vikrant from its military mission; and d) force India to keep planes on
defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.
According to Anderson, there were many more Soviet assets in the region, in poised readiness. He stated that there were a total of sixteen Soviet ships and submarines near the combat area, though in reality, the Soviets reached only on the 18th and 26th. As far as Russian nuclear submarines are concerned, the reports were wrong, while an Alpha class prototype was developed in 1971, the Delta class was inducted only in 1974, and hence, there was no Russian nuclear submarine trailing the 7th fleet. Were the Soviets like the US testing their naval surge capabilities and also posturing for public eyes? Some strategists believe so and conclude that the US were victors in that sense - The US found it took them 5-6 days to get to the Indian Ocean while the Soviets took 10-15 days.
According to him, this pressure resulted in firm Indian assurances via Moscow that it would not attack W Pakistan. He concludes - Next day Mrs. Gandhi offered an unconditional cease‐fire in the West. There is no doubt in my mind that it was a reluctant decision resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistence, including the fleet movement and the willingness to risk the summit. Kissinger also mentions that Yahya and Niazi held on long enough, i.e., until the 16th, time enough for US to ensure that the 7th fleet strategy was in place, to deter a W Pakistan attack. Then again, if there had been no such Indian West Pakistan attack plan, such a deterrence move becomes purposeless, simply because there was nothing to deter.
But in a meeting with Zhou En Lai June 20th, 1972,
he said - The reason we moved our Fleet into the Indian Ocean was not
because of India primarily – it was as pressure on the Soviet Union if the
Soviets did what I mentioned before. This is a bit confusing, though
Sheldon Simon states in his 1973 paper that - The Soviets, meanwhile, were reported
to have fulfilled their part of the security arrangement with India not only
through stepped up military supplies but also through timely troop movements
along China's borders.
People continue to ponder over the question - Did India
indeed have a plan to roll into Pakistan, as Bhutto, Yahya and Nixon feared? Who
was the CIA mole in Delhi who fed them this information and started the whole
rigamarole? It was obviously a very senior asset.
Kissinger writes - A report ( 8th Dec?) reached
us from a source whose reliability we had never had any reason to doubt and
which I do not question today, to the effect that Prime Minister Gandhi was
determined to reduce even West Pakistan to impotence: she had indicated that
India would not accept any General Assembly call for a cease‐fire until
Bangladesh was “liberated”; after that, Indian forces would proceed with the
“liberation” of the Southern part of Azad Kashmir—the Pakistani part of
Kashmir—and continue fighting until the Pakistani army and air force were wiped
out. He added in his memoirs that Anderson never understood the strategical
significance of all this.
In subsequent years, many allegations were leveled at prominent
people in power, but nothing ever came out of those allegations. Indira Gandhi
stated that no such discussion took place in any cabinet meeting (the details
of which had purportedly been sent as a cable by the mole, confirming India’s
intent to invade West Pakistan) according to Srinath Raghavan. The mystery
still remains.
Anyway, as all this ended, many Indians were left with some distrust
of America, while Kissinger moved on to work with new masters, after
muttering to Ambassador Keating, "the President has a special feeling
for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of
life”. Interestingly we can see from Kissinger’s memoirs that he is still
mystified at why he and Nixon did not get any Congressional or public support
for what they staunchly believed in – that India was at fault and Pakistan was
in the right, as well as the US response. He says - But neither our
briefings nor the overwhelming expression of world opinion softened media or
Congressional criticism.
But there was still some humor to take back - When
discussing the final, feeble UN resolution (where Bush termed India as the
aggressor), Kissinger told the UN Ambassador, George W Bush - “don’t screw it
up the way you usually do.” to which Bush Senior replied, “I want a transfer
when this is over. I want a nice quiet place like Rwanda.”
This was all long ago, and life today, so also the world,
has changed drastically, with another cold war looming at the horizon, though
the players are pretty much the same. It is all difficult to track, and to put
simply, as I do often - Geopolitics is best understood by those in power, not
mere mortals like us!
The Blood Telegram – Nixon, Kissinger & a forgotten genocide – Gary J. Bass
1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh - Srinath Raghavan
Revisiting the 1971 ‘USS Enterprise Incident’: Rhetoric, Reality and Pointers for the Contemporary Era – Raghavendra Mishra
Superpower naval diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani CRISIS - James M. McConnell, Anne M. Kelly
Operational Aspects of the 1971 War in the Maritime Domain - Srikant B. Kesnur, M. Doraibabu and Ashish Kale
Nixon, Kissinger, and the "Soviet Card" in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 - Evelyn Goh
Indo-US Relations, 1947-71: Fractured friendship - Shri Ram Sharma
The White House Years, 1968-72 – Henry Kissinger
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