The Liberation of Goa

Menon, Nehru, Portugal, and the USA

This is a hotly debated topic and as always, there are many sides to it, with the pro-Portuguese lobby, mainly the descendants of the Portuguese, against the liberation and the pro-Indian lobby which strongly supporting its accession. Then there is the argument on why it took so many years to throw out the Portuguese. On top of all that, many have used the topic to take potshots at somebody they don’t like, and this would either be VK Krishna Menon or Jawaharlal Nehru. It is a subject covered in a few books and many newspaper articles. But as none of them are quite complete or fully accurate, I thought it best to open the room and bring in some fresh air, especially around the geopolitical developments and the final decision-making, plus the precipitation with action.

Historically Goa was a fishing port that was forcefully taken by the Portuguese admiral Albuquerque, over 400 years ago, who dreamed of establishing an empire in India, but governed from Lisbon. In Nov 1510, Albuquerque captured Goa, after which the fierce soldier settled down to don the robes of a statesman. Thus, Goa became a Portuguese stronghold and later, a colony, with a sizable Luso-Indian mestiço population. Most of the local populace was pushed out and spoken Konkani was banned.

As the British EIC and later the crown took over the reins of the country, isolated pockets of major foreign domination remained at Pondicherry, Mahe (French), Goa, Daman & Diu (Portuguese). After India gained independence in 1947, the de facto transfer of the French Indian territories to India took place in 1954 with Pondicherry becoming a union territory (transfer treaty signed in 1956 and finally ratified by France in 1962). Portugal on the other hand, refused to negotiate on the sovereignty of its Indian enclaves. Let’s now take up the story of Goa, from this point.

The Western world was by now in the grip of the ‘Cold War’. In Portugal, the strongman dictator António de Oliveira Salazar dug in his heels and redefined the colony of Goa in 1951 as a Portuguese overseas province so that it could come under the NATO umbrella and be legally construed as part of Portugal. As Portugal had become a NATO member, they assumed that they would have NATO support in the case of Goa. Nehru was aware of this complication and did not want the situation to become a global hot point. On 11 June 1953, the Indian delegation in Lisbon was closed, and diplomatic ties were formally severed. Mass rallies addressed by Nehru put a spotlight on the Goa issue. Nehru however, reiterated that no coercion would be used to join India.

From then onwards, the discussions meandered on, and the Portuguese refused to move out of Goa and vacillated. Various nonviolent means were launched, led by the Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti during 1954-55. Nehru’s government, fearing a backlash on innocent and unarmed satyagrahis, banned Indians from entering Goa. The resulting deportations to Portugal and several violent incidents did not provoke Nehru since he believed that non-violence would solve this issue. The Portuguese then sealed the borders and cut off the rail links. In response, the Nehru government imposed an economic blockade. Nehru argued that the Goans were Indians by every standard and that Goa was a colony ruthlessly administered by a racist and fascist colonial regime, "just a pimple on the face of India".

In October 1961, the seminar of the Portuguese Colonial Possessions in New Delhi resulted in the African leaders requesting Nehru “to show the way”, so that their freedom could follow. At the Chowpatty rally in Bombay in the same month, Nehru spoke for the first time about the need to use “other methods” to solve the problem.

Patel and Goa

Let us check how Sardar Patel viewed the situation. Though many feel that Patel may have acted forcefully if he were in charge, he was not quite bothered but had aired some strong views on the matter. In a meeting involving the approval of the Navy’s 10-year plan, Patel had asked Vice Admiral Krishnan (then the Captain of INS Shivaji) if the Indian Navy could push out the Portuguese. Krishnan replied in the affirmative and stated so in his reminiscences. 

KPS Menon recounts a cabinet meeting in an Akashvani article, involving Patel – Britain has left India, and France is on the point of leaving its Indian settlements. Portugal, however, is determined to hang on to its settlements, Goa, Daman, and Diu. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet meets in order to discuss what measures should be taken to compel Portugal to relinquish its hold on Goa etc. Apart from myself as Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Commerce Secretary are also present. We make certain proposals for bringing pressure to bear on the Portuguese administration in Goa, such as a curb on remittances from Goa to India, restriction on the employment of Goans in India, etc. Nehru is inclined to approve these proposals. Rajaji takes an astonishing line. He asserts that the Goans after all are our brothers, that nothing should be done to harass them and they should be won over by love. The discussion goes on and on. Sardar Patel seems hardly interested; he seems almost asleep. Suddenly he wakes up and says: “Shall we go in? It is two hours work”. Nehru is shocked at the suggestion. How can we use force in Goa, he asks - we who have been condemning the use of force and insisting that all international issues should be settled through peaceful means? Sardar Patel does not press his point, and Goa remains a Portuguese settlement for another two decades. Eventually, repression in Goa passes all endurable limits, India's patience is exhausted, and by the merest show of force, Goa is integrated into India. Sardar Patel gives way over Nepal and Goa because they pertain to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which Nehru is in charge. In matters connected with his own portfolio, he is adamant.

I feel that Patel would have abstained since the Portuguese were founding members of NATO in 1950. India-USSR rapprochement had started only after 1955 with Krushchev’s accession.  Indian positioning between Russia and America was a careful balancing act and as a Non-aligned country, much care had to be taken to not tilt it either way. How complicated the game was will become clear in the following paragraphs, though when viewed today, it tends to get oversimplified.

NATO, USA, Portugal, and Goa

While India was concerned about Goa, America was carefully nurturing its relations with Portugal due to its need for military bases in the Azores, a Portuguese-administered archipelago in the Atlantic Ocean, much needed to track and hunt German U Boats. The earlier pact between them which had been renewed in 1951 would now expire in 1956. The Azores was now needed as the location to install an early warning system in the event an atomic war erupted, and it was of even bigger strategic importance.

America had refused to make any public statement condemning the action of the Indians in preventing passage during the episode Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 1954. US-Portugal relations cooled due to this US reluctance to take Portugal’s side on Goa.

The Portuguese government suspended negotiations for the renewal of the Azores base until the Eisenhower administration approved the so-called Dulles - Cunha memorandum, prepared in 1955 after the visit by Paulo Cunha to the United States. A joint statement referring explicitly to the existence of ‘Portuguese provinces’ - instead of colonies was released. The subtle distinction was crucial for the Portuguese, who claimed they did not have an empire or any colonies in Africa or Asia, but instead possessed ‘overseas provinces’ with the same constitutional status as ‘continental provinces’. Dulles stated that Goa was always considered a ‘Portuguese Province’ and belonged to Portugal for more than four hundred years. Later, when Dulles was asked if his declarations were a sign of ‘support of the United States to the position of Portugal in the controversy about Goa, he declared only that the United States was interested in seeing the problem solved by ‘peaceful means’.

I must add also that there were rumors (ominous whispers) of a NATO base being planned at Goa, and Nehru addressed this in a Rajya Sabha speech in 1957.  According to the Economic Weekly report, Sept 21, 1957 - Pandit Nehru issued a clear warning that any attempt to form a base in Goa "would be an unfriendly act to India, and every country that helps or supports that move will thereby be committing this unfriendly act against India, and India will not tolerate it, whatever be the consequences". He added that Portugal and her NATO allies can no longer be in any doubt about India's firm policy to Goa. India has tried all possible means, short of war, to settle the problem of Goa.

When JFK became the US president in 1960, the equations changed, for he supported an anticolonial policy. Portugal then led by the 71-year-old dictator; Oliveira Salazar was worried. During the 1961 Angola matter, America formally took a position that it would not support Portugal’s colonial policies. This was one of the reasons why a decision was taken by Nehru in 1961 to act, and why nothing had been done until then. As is obvious, these Cold War equations and behind-the-scenes parleys are not obvious to the lay reader. Now there is also the aspect of non-alignment and Nehru’s image getting slighted, left to be discussed, and I will get to it shortly.

India finally decided to force the issue, in 1961, just as the window opened slightly. But the situation changed again in 1962, as the Azores became even more important due to the nuclear crisis, and the US delegation started to abstain from such UN resolutions. An excellent article by Luís Nuno Rodrigues explains all these succinctly.

Pakistani and NATO Intrigues

Nevertheless, other events troubled the Indian decision-makers. As matters were heating up and Nehru was discussing the situation with Kennedy, Salazar started discussions with Pakistan. While NATO powers did not get involved, and Britain who had a direct pact with Portugal vacillated, there were some intriguing incidents mentioned in the accounts of the military officers – namely those at the helm of affairs, BM Kaul, and DK Palit.

Kaul mentions how a Canberra flying to Cochin from Bombay was buzzed by a supersonic fighter, though he does not mention whose plane it could be. He writes - Air Marshal Engineer, the Air Chief, reported that when one of our Canberra’s, flying at a speed at about 600 miles per hour, was carrying out a certain mission, on our side of the border, its pilot saw on his radar screen, that he was being chased by a supersonic jet, flying at about twice the speed of our Canberra, from which he broke contact at once and returned to base. This account baffled us all. Whose plane could it be, with a mach-2 speed (about 1,500 miles per hour)? Did the Portuguese keep such planes in Dabolim/Goa? Or were they being assisted in the air by one of their allies? If so, who was this ally? These questions, however, remained unanswered.

We also received reliable information that Pakistan proposed exploiting this situation. They concentrated their forces threateningly along our Punjab borders. They were holding a big exercise which was significantly prolonged to coincide with this period. Families of their officers and other ranks were evacuated from certain areas. Leave to their service personnel was canceled. These reports convinced us of a collusion between Portugal and Pakistan against us. Menon informed Nehru of all these developments. It was the desire of both Nehru and Menon to solve the problem of Goa peacefully. But the Portuguese were forcing their hands.

DK Palit adds - Late that afternoon (29^th Nov 1961), while the CGS and I were discussing the results of the visit to Nehru, Air Chief Aspy Engineer telephoned to say that he had some startling information he would like to discuss with the CGS. That morning one of our Canberra bombers on a photo-reconnaissance mission over Goa had been tailed by two unknown fighters even before it had crossed the Goa border. Warning of the presence of the fighters was received, that evasive action had failed to shake them off, and as the Canberra began its photo run, the fighters began to close in. When they had approached to within 1,500 metres the Canberra broke away and escaped, but not before its radar had indicated a burst of fire from one of the fighters. Engineer said that in his opinion, based on the rate of close-in, the fighters were probably F-86 Sabre jets, and so could have been from either the Portuguese or the Pakistani air force. The results of the photo-recce mission indicated that Dabolim, Goa's only airfield, had recently built two hangars that could possibly have sheltered fighter aircraft; it was, however, later ascertained that the Portuguese had at no time stationed fighter aircraft at Dabolim. The mystery was never solved, but in all likelihood, fighters from Pakistan had temporarily operated from Dabolim. The plan to go back and try to lure the fighters out was nixed by Menon and deferred to a later date.

Then there was the case of the mystery submarine and Palit explains - An interesting item of information given us was that on 7^th December our anti-submarine frigate had reported positive identification of a submarine off Goa and had fired a depth charge at the target. Years later I learned that when some of our naval ships made a courtesy call at Singapore sometime in 1963-4, they picked up dock gossip that a damaged British submarine had limped into port at Christmastime for repairs, to what appeared to be bomb damage.

Operation Vijay

Menon, the defense minister, authorized the movement of troops (with air and naval support) to the Goa border and soon the world was aware that India was going to force the issue. By Dec 13^th the troops were in position and plans were finalized. Before long, each of these plans was leaked (either through Goan officers serving in the army or staff at Delhi HQ) and the US asked Nehru not to attack. Hostilities at Goa began at 09:45 on 17 December 1961, and on the morning of 18 December, the 50th Para Brigade of the Indian Army moved into Goa with three columns.

On 18 December, a Portuguese request was made to the UN Security Council for a debate on the conflict in Goa. The request was approved when seven members supported the request (the US, UK, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Taiwan), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the United Arab Republic and Liberia). In the ensuing debate, the US delegate, Adlai Stevenson, strongly criticized India's use of force to resolve her dispute with Portugal, stressing that such a resort to violent means was against the charter of the UN.

Interestingly, Salazar had asked Vassallo Silva to hold on for 8 days, as he wanted to send Portuguese naval support to Goa. But as it turned out, Egyptian President Nasser refused passage for the Portuguese ship carrying men and ammunition to Goa, because the war in Goa was a liberation from foreign rule.

By the evening of 18 December, most of Goa had been overrun by advancing Indian forces. Orders delivered by the Portuguese President demanded a scorched earth policy—that Goa was to be destroyed before it was given up to the Indians. Despite his orders from Lisbon, Governor General Manuel António Vassallo e Silva took stock of the numerical superiority of the Indian troops, as well as the food and ammunition supply available to his forces, and decided to surrender.

The official Portuguese surrender was conducted in a formal ceremony held at 20:30 hours on 19 December when Governor General Manuel António Vassallo e Silva signed the instrument of surrender formally ending 451 years of Portuguese Rule in Goa. As expected, the Portuguese government severed all diplomatic links with India and refused to recognize the incorporation of the seized territories into the Indian Republic.

Relations between India and Portugal thawed only in 1974, when, following an anti-colonial military coup d'état and the fall of the authoritarian rule in Lisbon, Goa was finally recognized as part of India, and steps were taken to re-establish diplomatic relations with India. On 31 December 1974, a treaty was signed between India and Portugal with the Portuguese recognizing full sovereignty of India over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli.

The decision-making process.

Now let us focus on the actual decision to attack. Who was involved and when/how was it taken?

On 24 November 1961, Sabarmati, a passenger boat passing between the Indian port of Kochi and the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv, was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in the death of a passenger and injuries to the chief engineer. Menon explains to Brecher in an interview - When the ship passed through these waters and was attacked, the Prime Minister told me once, ‘I am sure that the time has come; we have to stop this’. He said, ‘We should push them off these islands; the Navy and others should do this.’ …. We knew Pakistan was negotiating with them. Panditji was quite clear that the Portuguese must go. He would not put up with them shooting at our ships. But he was undecided about what steps to take. We fixed a date [to march into Goa], and the Americans got hold of the news; I believe they passed it on to the Portuguese, their NATO ally....Then the Americans put pressure on us to cancel or postpone our plans. My Prime Minister said, ‘Yes, we will postpone it.’ He did so to give the Americans an opportunity to advise the Portuguese. We postponed it for a few days. We fixed another date: I am afraid I did not tell even the P.M. this time because I feared he would think it his duty to tell others...

An interesting aspect to keep in mind is that on the night before the attack, BM Kaul had invited American Ambassador Galbraith and the British HC Gore-Booth, for a dinner. He did not cancel it but left Delhi, raising much suspicion and a mad dash by Galbraith, who sensed something was afoot, to confront Nehru.

On D-Day, Galbraith tried to put pressure on Nehru, to accept the US proposal that India do nothing for six months and the U.S.A. would see what they could do about it. Nehru told him something to the effect that India might perhaps consider it. Menon adds - When he told me this, I said, ‘I am very sorry: the troops have moved.’ When Brecher asked Menon if it was Nehru’s consent or acquiescence, Menon replied in the negative and added - Nehru wanted something to be done.. Somebody has got to try and draw the other people’s fire. Nehru was most anxious that it should not be interpreted in the world that India was going in like conquering heroes.

Many in the Indian press and America mentioned that Nehru and Menon had decided on the timing to help Menon win the elections in Bombay. Menon retorted to Brecher - That is a canard put out by the United States press, probably inspired. Some of the critics said that Krishna Menon did it to gain votes in Bombay. There is only a handful of Goans in my constituency. There was nothing new in it because it was Government policy, and people around here are sensible enough to know that all this was propaganda against the Government and the country designed by interested parties to shake our firmness in remaining independent.

While it is admirable that Menon admitted to taking a unilateral decision in the 1964/65 Brecher interview, was it entirely, correct? As it turns out he did not know that behind his back, BM Kaul and Nehru had a meeting on the very subject. Kaul and Palit, both mention it in their memoirs and point out other aspects.

Palit mentions - Nehru sent for Kaul on the morning of 5 December to tell him that he wanted D-Day to be put forward to 7 or 8 December in order to forestall any move by the United Nations to prevent the occupation. Kaul firmly resisted this, saying that the date of invasion could be advanced by perhaps one or two days, but not by a week; furthermore, he would have to consult the GOC-in-C Southern Command and the task force commander before he could agree to an earlier date. Nehru withdrew his request and we heard no more about it. The CGS (Kaul) summoned me to his office at 5 p.m. and directed me to bring with me a letter addressed to GOC-in-C Southern Command ready for the Chief's signature, but with the date of D-Day left blank. Thapar was waiting with Biji (Kaul) in the latter's office. With uncharacteristic melodrama, he took the message from me without saying a word and in his own hand inscribed the date: '18^th December'.

On the 15th Nehru sent for Kaul to discuss a possible deferment of the operation. The cabinet had not been consulted; in this instance, even Krishna Menon seems to have been short-circuited by the extraordinary procedure of a PM-CGS consultation on a matter of high diplomatic policy. Kaul told me after returning from the Prime Minister's office that it had taken him a good half-hour to convince Nehru that with troops poised for action 'no other course was open to us now' - unless, of course, Portugal was to undertake to evacuate Goa within an acceptable time limit.

Kaul writes - I, therefore, suggested that we should ignore foreign advice in a matter which we had fully considered and in which we had taken a firm decision. Nehru paced up and down in his room, took a few puffs at his cigarette, and appeared to be undecided. Whilst his people expected him to take stern action in this matter, he was worried that many important countries in the world disapproved of this step. Moreover, he personally disliked using force to solve any problem. He was in a difficult position, as heads of Government usually are, on whom rests the weight of heavy responsibility. After thinking for a while, Nehru reluctantly agreed that we should go ahead with our present orders. He was perhaps finally swayed to take this decision because he realized his people expected him to liberate Goa. He thought that if he failed to act on this occasion, both the people and the armed forces might lose faith in him.

Aftermath

General Vassallo e Silva who surrendered to avert the massacre of the men under his command, and who bravely disobeyed his president's order to burn the palace, went back to Portugal together with many others, via Pakistan. He was stripped of his rank and expelled from the army. However, after Portugal's dictatorship fell in a military coup in 1974, he was reinstated as a General amid tributes to his moral courage in defying Salazar. He passed away in 1985.

The many letters exchanged between Kennedy and Nehru explain the mental agony that Nehru was going through. He must have felt (I don’t know if he heard) terrible when Kennedy remarked to BK Nehru that the Goan affair, after all the preaching of nonviolence and non-alignment, was akin to a pastor/town preacher getting caught in a brothel! And JFK’s question - why India did not act decisively 15 years earlier like any normal country would have done, instead of preaching nonviolence, must have jarred him.

Nehru explained in his letter to JFK - Any action we took, even though otherwise justified, was likely to have consequences in other fields that would be undesirable. It was mainly this consideration which kept us from taking any action during the last many years because we felt even the right action should be avoided if it had any such consequences.

It is all water under the bridge, I suppose, but I thought it a good idea to go over the related events & facts, for those interested in the background.

References

India and world politics: Krishna Menon's view of the world – Michael Brecher

The Untold Story – BM Kaul
War in the High Himalayas, The Indian Army in Crisis 1962 – DK Palit
Ambassador’s journal – DK Palit
Correspondence – JF Kennedy & Jawaharlal Nehru
Goa’s Struggle for Freedom – PP Shirodkar
Salazar: A Political Biography - de Meneses, Filipe
And many more…