Oak Tree – Intrigues at Charbatia

Only a few readers would have a decent idea about the CIA airbase in Orissa’s Charbatia, even though it has been talked about on occasion in the Indian press, and the details are at best murky except for a keen academician. As I got into studying the geopolitical involvements of the period during the short 1962 Sino India conflict, I found many an aspect relating to the base intriguing and interconnected, showing that there was so much more leading to it and many an aftermath.

The 1962 conflict between two nations which were somewhat friendly, led to a changed atmosphere in the Indian subcontinent. A deeply wounded India was shocked by the events culminating with the bloody conflicts between the 20th Oct 1962 and 20th Nov 1962. Defense Minister Krishna Menon, held responsible for the calamity, was quickly sent packing. His departure was also a precondition for support from America, and Nehru, chastened after what he always maintained was a Chinese betrayal, had to forego his old ideology of India as a nonaligned nation. Maybe he refused to believe Mao’s ideology that ‘The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta.’

As Nehru appealed for support, Kennedy, prepped by Ambassador Galbraith, provided some of the support requested by Nehru, mainly small arms and aircraft carrier support (if required), stopping short due to his preoccupation with the Cuban missile crisis and the existing US ties with Pakistan. Later on, the Sino Indian conflict was discussed in more detail and Kennedy agreed in May 1963 that "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India”. There are indications that even nuclear options were considered against China, should it be required.

Up north, the Russians were also seeing a breakup in their relations with China and a Sino Russia split was in the offing. Mao did not consider Khrushchev trustworthy or orthodox enough and the Russians in turn doubted Mao’s mental sanity. As the Sino-Soviet relations went from cool to a freeze during 1958 - 1959, the Russians reneged from a joint Nuclear development project in China and recalled all their personnel. China was also upset due to a lack of Russian support when the Dalai Lama fled to India and when Russia refused to side with China on the 1962 conflict with India. As things turned out, China decided to complete the Chic-1 (later named as Project 596) N bomb project themselves.

It was becoming clear that the Chinese would test their designs soon, perhaps towards the end of 1964. An alarmed America, considered ways and methods to stop this and tried to obtain support from USSR, but the Soviets refused the US offer to participate in a joint Soviet-American pre-emptive attack against the PRC. Kennedy was even mulling the use of “an anonymous airplane to go over there,” and “take out the Chinese facilities.” In the US, studies and ‘what if’ scenarios were quickly conducted. A neutral inclination was the conclusion since it was perceived that Chinese nukes would not be of any direct consequence to America and secondly, getting involved in this matter would only worsen American perception in SE Asia. In Nov 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated and since the election in Nov 1964 was close, President Johnson decided to maintain a dovish stance.

The CIA was tasked to determine as much as they could about China’s nuclear program, and details of where and when China might be ready to conduct a nuclear test. This was how high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance flights which had previously been used to map out USSR’s military might, were diverted to check out on the reality in China. It was a complex task but before we get to that, let’s get a brief overview of the American U-2 program.

The Lockheed U-2, nicknamed "Dragon Lady", was an American single-jet engine, ultra-high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, usually operated by the CIA. By 1958, The US already had an airbase at Incirlik in Turkey. With Ayub’s agreement, the US established a facility in Badaber, near Peshawar. Badaber enabled the monitoring of missile test sites in the USSR, also providing key infrastructure and communications, and U-2’s could now take off from this airfield thus providing valuable photo intelligence in a pre-satellite era (the U-2 photos provided higher resolution in those days).

On 1^st May 1960, however, during his next flight code-named ‘Grand sham’ in order to photograph ICBM and plutonium production sites (information which was needed before the important Paris summit planned a few days later), luck ran out for pilot Gary Powers, for the Soviets were waiting (It appears that one Selmer Nielson, a Norwegian who spied for the Russians had been providing the information about the flight plans and U-2 activity).

The Russians shot down the U-2, Powers ejected, was captured alive and the &^&* hit the fan. America who did not know of Powers’s fate, stalled, not admitting to the spying flights, but when Khrushchev produced proof that Powers was in their hands, the US president had to apologize and the summit meeting at Paris expectedly failed. The Pakistani’s fearing exposure and cornered by Russia, backtracked and stated that they had no idea of such clandestine operations being done in their backyard. Peshawar continued to remain operational even after; the US was now working with Pakistani pilots flying the Droopy RB 57B’s with side-looking cameras which could take photographs at 65,000-80,000 feet and 60 miles away. The Americans had in the meantime established airbases in Thailand as well as near Taiwan for the U-2, but the sites in China were still at the edge of the U-2’s capacities. The years 1960-65 were the years when the high mountains and areas bordering China, Pakistan and India saw much action.

A little recap on the US -Tibet-India involvements would provide a good backdrop to all this. It was in 1956 that the US, more specifically the CIA got involved in the Tibet matter, attempting to support Tibetan freedom from the Chinese, as the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and moved to Kalimpong in protest while the CIA established training camps and provided support to the Khampas of Tibet. The Dalai Lama had expressed his desire to flee to India when he met Nehru in 1957. Nehru was alarmed, and much as he wanted to help Tibet, he was wary of the Chinese reaction if he granted the Dalai Lama asylum. Adding to the tangle was the fact that both Mao from Communist China as well as Chiang Kai-Shek of Nationalist China in Taiwan believed that Tibet was an integral part of Mainland China. Thereafter, both PRC’s Zhou Enlai and US’s Eisenhower pressed Nehru on the Tibet issue, putting him under immense pressure.

Around Jan 1959, the Khampas rose up in revolt, and in March 1959, as the commotion intensified, the Dalai Lama fled south, with some supporters. After his departure, pandemonium broke out in Lhasa. At Chongye, the Dalai Lama, hearing that Lhasa had been taken, repudiated the 17-point agreement previously signed by his team and sped to the Indian border. Meanwhile, Nehru, requested formally to provide asylum to the Tibetan leader confirmed: “Of course”. By mid-April, The Dalai Lama arrived at Bomdilla. He met with PN Menon and AK Dave, but they could not come to an agreement since the Dalai Lama wanted to proclaim independence and form a ‘government in exile’ at India, together with his supporters. The Dalai Lama was welcomed in India but was warned not to talk about starting a local government in exile in India. As matters transpired, he settled down at Dharmashala, did allude to exactly that (independence), putting Nehru in a tough spot with China, from that point onwards.

Nehru in a quandary, faced the flak, all alone. In fact, just as the Dalai Lama was fleeing Lhasa, Nehru had recommitted his intention of maintaining good relations with China. Now with the Dalai Lama wanting to proclaim independence and welcome his followers there, he was in a real fix. China lodged strong protests, insinuating that India had kidnapped the Dalai Lama and was supporting the Lhasa rebellion, while Nehru pointed out that Zhou En-Lai had actually mentioned to him that Tibet was an autonomous region and not a Chinese province, as such. China wanted the Dalai Lama back. At this juncture, while the Soviet leader Khrushchev supported the Chinese, he also found fault with the Chinese authoritarian attitude which caused the rebellion in the first place.

America stayed silent, on the sidelines, ostensibly to insulate India and Tibet from further Chinese wrath. All this was entirely unexpected for the CIA and its Khampa guerillas. Faced with the might of the PLA bearing down on them, they lay low. Taipei signaled that they were not against the Tibetan leader’s aspirations, but did not do much more. The US stated that they could not formally recognize the Tibetan government in exile or an independent Tibet. On top of all that no other Buddhist country wanted to take over the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The Dalai Lama and his brother were miffed that the Americans seemed lukewarm though they had been supporting the Tibetan cause at the UN. In Oct the UN passed a resolution deploring Chinese violation of human rights in Tibet. But the Dalai Lama passed off a golden opportunity to visit the US (he wanted to be received as a head of state, which was a no go) and speak at the UN. Meanwhile, the CIA assisted Tibet Task Force continued with their skirmishes. Through the 1960-61 period, various airdrops were organized from the Thai airbase, and India did not object to any overflights.

All this could have had a direct bearing in the 1962 Sino Indian conflict. While most people dwell on the borderlines and the forward policy, I would tend to believe that the Chinese lashed out at the efforts by the Indians supported by the US in not only supporting the Dalai Lama establish himself in India, but also with a belief that India was coordinating and abetting the guerilla forces, keeping the PLA on their toes. It was a personal affront to Mao, and that I believe was the prime reason in his (in his unstable mind) wanting to teach Nehru, a lesson. The 1962 debacle followed a story we have dealt with previously, and after a 30-day conflict, the Chinese withdrew, leaving Indian morale in shambles and Nehru in a deep depression.

In 1963, Pakistan then went on to conclude a border agreement with China and pulled out of Tibetan covert operations which they had been supporting from East Pakistan. Ayub Khan under relentless Soviet pressure over the U-2 business later visited the Soviet Union in 1965 and gave them an indication that when the ten-year lease of the Badaber base ended in 1969, he would not renew it with the US. The American’s were still not ready with advancements to satellite reconnaissance and so the use of U-2’s was the only open avenue.

Now we get back to the U-2 business. On 11^th Nov 1962, Nehru allowed the US to use the U-2 to check out border incursions by the Chinese and permitted its refueling over Indian airspace. The U-2 Detachment G which operated out of Thakhili in Thailand flew over India (overflight above Burma was not permitted) and took the pictures in Dec 62 and Jan 63, and these results were used by Nehru to update the parliament. The US did this for two reasons, first to determine the situation on the Indian border themselves and the second to establish a precedent with the U-2 overflight over India and to come up with the subsequent request of setting up a base in India in order to not only map the Western regions of USSR but also the Chinese nuclear and missile activities. During and after the 1962 border skirmishes, large amounts of small arms and training personnel arrived from the US, so also support in setting up an Indian intelligence network to run covert operations in Tibet (Operation St. Circus). This went on to create the ARC (Aviation Research Center) and the SFF establishment (Est 22) later, a story by itself.

The main person behind the development of all these plans and strategies from the Indian side was Biju Patnaik, a daring pilot (with numerous high-profile exploits to his credit) and Nehru’s friend, working with BN Mullik and the CIA, just as the war in the hills with the Chinese was in full swing. Patnaik was chosen by Nehru to discuss matters with the US concerning China and Tibet. In March 1963, Patnaik, as Nehru’s defense adviser, was sent to Washington. He visited the Pentagon and it is said that he also visited the CIA headquarters at Langley.

The main Chinese targets to be monitored were missile range in Kansu province, the Lanzhou reactor site and the nuclear test site at Lop Nur. The Thai U-2 flights did not quite pan out, and the Taiwan U-2’s were getting hit by Chinese SAM’s, so Galbraith requested a base in India, formally in the spring of 1963. President John F Kennedy reiterated it in his June 1963 meeting with President Radhakrishnan which the latter acceded to in principle.

Patnaik who had created Kalinga airlines had proposed but naturally, the pre-WW II airfield in Orissa named Charbatia. But it took quite a while and many deliberations between Nehru, Mullick, Patnaik and Galbraith before Nehru agreed to it. Detachment G continued to use Takhli when it staged four sorties over Tibet from 29 September to 10 November 1963. In late 1963, India finally resolved matters concerning the use of Charbatia Air Base (Oak tree) as a staging base for U-2s.

A lot of other activities related to the Tibetan tactical forces, also transpired at the Charbatia base meanwhile, under the aegis of what was known as Establishment 22. The Charbatia airbase, now code-named Oak Tree and still in the midst of a reconstruction, was a busy place, with work going on in full swing. Flights came in with equipment from Thakhili, and we get an idea of the situation on the ground from this quote - A relic of World War II, Charbatia had fallen into a severe state of disrepair. More remarkable than its poor condition were the precautions taken to keep the CIA's largesse a secret from the die-hard Soviet supporters among New Delhi's political elite. "We flew the last few miles just fifty feet above the ground to avoid radar," said pilot Neese Hicks. "We would land at dawn, eat a fast breakfast, and be back in the air toward Takhli."

Even though work was on, the strip suitable for the U-2 was completed only by May 1964. Patnaik donated steel furniture from one of his factories, cleared out his Kalinga Air Lines offices to serve as a makeshift officer’s quarters, and even loaned two of his Kalinga captains for the effort.

The first U-2 flight from Charbatia took off in May 1964, but it was not meant to be, for while landing, the flight had difficulties as the brakes failed on landing and the U-2 got stuck in the mud. Getting it unstuck quickly without the press and the leftists knowing, was a harrowing experience for the Americans. Jawaharlal Nehru passed away three days later, and further U-2 operations were postponed.

Detachment H in Taiwan flew over Chinese Nuclear installations in 1963. The Chinese increased their SAM installations and while the US had special jammers, they did not install them in these U-2’s for fear that it would get into Chinese hands if a U-2 was shot down. The situation was dire, precise information was needed badly about the nuclear program, but trained Taiwanese pilots and U-2’s themselves were in short supply and since three of the four U-2’s had been lost already by then. Detachment H’s overflights over the PRC were thus stalled.

It was already August 1964 and Chinese preparations to test their device were ongoing at the Lop Nor nuclear site. In desperation, the US allowed the installation of antimissile jammers on the remaining Detachment H’s U-2. But Lop Nor was 2,000 miles away from Taipei and inflight refueling was not possible. It was 1,650 miles from Takhili, and only 1,200 miles North of Charbatia. By the time the approvals came from Washington for a Taiwanese pilot to fly out from Takhili, the Chinese detonated their device on Oct 10^th, 1964. While it is still not clear, it is possible that the Chinese used material from a Soviet-supplied reactor to detonate their test bomb and for the later tests used material from the Lanzhou centrifuges.

Anyway, more flights took off after Oct 64, returning with loads of photos. The next requirement was scanning over Lanzhou and Lop Nor using infrared scanners mounted on the last U-2, which was carried out in Jan 65. The flight went well, information was sent off to the US, but three days later the last U-2 of Detachment H was shot down.  More U-2’s were subsequently deployed and flights continued with the jamming radar switched on throughout the flight, in order to avoid SAM attacks. In Dec 1964, a couple of excellent operations were also carried out from Charbatia, as a forward staging base.

The CIA record states “The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but others remained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G returned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however, Takhli had become the main base for Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. In all Charbatia staged 4 flight operations, one in May 64 and three in Dec 1964. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967.

Then came 1965 and the 17-day Indian border war with Pakistan, following Pak’s botched ‘Operation Gibraltar’. China hinted at nuclear retaliation to support Pakistan, but harsh warnings from the Americans and Russians resulted in their earning a rebuke even from Pakistan. As years passed by and Pakistan warmed up to the Chinese, India cemented military ties with Russia and intelligence ties with the CIA. The Charbatia ARC communications center continued its operations.

Seeing that a lot of equipment and aid provided to Pakistan was used for the war effort against India, the Americans placed sanctions on both India and Pakistan. The furious Pakistanis retaliated by refusing the extension of the expiring 10-year lease and this resulted in the shutting down of the Badaber base and the immensely successful Earthling radar system. The CIA then established the Checkrote system in Taiwan. That was how and why the next CIA plot, Operation Hat at the Nandadevi monitoring station was hatched, which I had written about, earlier.

In 1969, the USSR planned to make a pre-emptive atomic-bomb attack on China, and asked the United States to stay neutral. The Nixon administration warned that such an attack on the PRC would provoke a Third World War. The US viewed the Soviets as a greater threat and wanted China to counterbalance the USSR, still annoyed by the earlier Soviet rejection of the American proposal of a joint attack on China.

As time passed by, equations changed again - China and the United States entered a tacit anti-Soviet alliance in 1972, just eight years after the PRC acquired a nuclear weapons capability. The US government pulled out CIA from the Charbatia program as relations with India soured in the early 1970s and with Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China in order to improve US-China bilateral relationship

The ARC unit constructed by the CIA together with Patnaik still remained, and RAW - Research and Analysis Wing, India's primary foreign intelligence agency, operated its ariel intelligence collection center at the ARC. Soon enough, satellite reconnaissance took over with ISRO managing most of it. Thus, by the late 1980s, Charbatia’s importance had considerably diminished. The Indian government didn't seem to know what to do with it. I read that the plant was even considered to produce bullet-proof government cars for politicians.

Two questions can be reviewed with the 62 war as a backdrop. Was the 62-conflict meant to teach India a lesson due Mao’s irritation about India’s perceived interference in Tibetan affairs. Was it an affront to the PLA’s attempts to create a stronghold on Tibet, something they had been trying since 1950? Was it due to the Indian support for the Dalia Lama, his formation of a government in exile, the support for CIA involvement, the Khampa revolts and especially the Tibet monitoring and training set up at Charbatia? I am starting to feel so, and that it was not really at all about the borders.

Or was it a ploy by the Chinese to draw world attention away from Lop Nor and the U-265 enrichment at Lanzhou as they raced to complete their preparation for an A-bomb test? The U-2’s were flying about, the Russians wanted to nuke China, the Americans wanted to nuke China, the underground shelters were still not ready, so perhaps a diversion was in order?  A quick in and out of NEFA as a shocked world watched?

Just a thought…

Meanwhile, the U-2’s continue to be in service.

References

Spying from the Sky: At the Controls of US Cold War Aerial Intelligence - Robert L Richardson

The CIAs Secret War in Tibet - Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison

Maddy's Ramblings- The Nanda Devi Episode

Directorate of Science and Technology History – CIA declassified documents

The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974- Gregory W. Pedlow, Donald E. Welzenbach